i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which is the last end while some are desired, not only for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to some more perfect good. Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
Unde Tullius dicit, in II Rhet., quod quiddam est quod sua vi nos allicit, et sua dignitate trahit, ut virtus, veritas, scientia. Et hoc modo virtutes sunt propter se appetendae. Quaedam vero appetuntur et propter se, inquantum habent in seipsis aliquam rationem bonitatis, etiam si nihil aliud boni per ea nobis accideret, et tamen sunt appetibilia propter aliud, inquantum scilicet perducunt nos in aliquod bonum perfectius. Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.Īd primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., eorum quae propter se appetuntur, quaedam appetuntur solum propter se, et nunquam propter aliud, sicut felicitas, quae est ultimus finis. Now honor, as stated above ( Question, Article, ad 2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in Phys. x) "honesty means an honorable state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy of honor. Et ideo honestum, proprie loquendo, in idem refertur cum virtute. Excellentia autem hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem, quia est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Honor autem, ut supra dictum est, excellentiae debetur. Unde ex hoc videtur aliquid dici honestum, quod est honore dignum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, honestas dicitur quasi honoris status. ii, 53) divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided. et in II Rhet., dividit honestum in quatuor virtutes principales, in quas etiam dividitur virtus. Sed contra est quod Tullius, in I de Offic. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. But virtue does not consist in external wealth. 11:14, "good things and evil, life and death are from God". Objection 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth. Sed in exterioribus divitiis non consistit virtus. XI, bona et mala, vita et mors, utraque a Deo sunt. Praeterea, honestas videtur consistere in exterioribus divitiis, secundum illud Eccli. 14:40, "Let all things be done decently and according to order" among you. But honesty seems to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. Objection 3: Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. XIV, omnia honeste et secundum ordinem fiant in vobis. Honestas autem magis videtur ad exteriorem conversationem pertinere, secundum illud I ad Cor. Praeterea, principale virtutis consistit in interiori electione, ut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. x) "honesty means an honorable state." Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, since "it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. Sed multis aliis debetur honor quam virtuti, nam virtuti proprie debetur laus, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Praeterea, secundum Isidorum, honestas dicitur quasi honoris status. i, 9) that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is desired for its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. Objection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. Virtus autem non petitur propter seipsam, sed propter felicitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in I Ethic., quod felicitas est praemium virtutis et finis. Dicit enim Tullius, in sua rhetorica honestum esse quod propter se petitur. Videtur quod honestum non sit idem virtuti. (4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?Īd primum sic proceditur. Quarto, utrum honestas sit pars temperantiae. (3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant Tertio, quomodo se habeat ad utile et delectabile. (1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous Primo, quomodo honestum se habeat ad virtutem. We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of inquiry: Fathers of the English Dominican Provinceĭeinde considerandum est de honestate.
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